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ARTICLES
ABUSIVE DEBT COLLECTION-A MODEL
STATUTE FOR VIRGINIA
ROBERT E. SCOTT* AND DIANE M. STRICKLAND"
I. ABUSIVE COLLECTION - THE PROBLEM STATED
Among the many by-products of the phenomenal growth of con-
sumer credit1 in the last two decades has been the attempt on the part
of existing legal institutions to grapple with the problem of coercive
debt collection. The existence of the problem is no longer disputed,
and the nature and extent of the abuse surrounding debt collection
practices has been the subject of voluminous commentary. Given the
dynamics of the competing interests involved when a creditor attempts
to collect a just debt which the debtor is unable to pay, an essential
conflict requiring regulated resolution becomes apparent. Unfortu-
nately, the problem is compounded when it is recognized that the debt
may not be validly due and owing, that the debtor may have a defense,
real or perceived, or that the debtor may merely be unwilling to pay,
either in fact or as perceived by the creditor. Since the information
available to either party is imperfect, it frequently is impossible to de-
termine the actual dimensions of the conflict as viewed from the vary-
*B.A., Oberlin College; J.D., College of William and Mary; L.L.M., S.J.D., Univer-
sit>' of Michigan. Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary.
** A.B., University of North Carolina; J.D., University of Virginia. Attorney, Stu-
dent Legal Services, University of Virginia.
1. As of December 1973, the total amount of credit outstanding was $180,486,000,000.
60 FED. RES. BuLL. A 54 (Feb. 1974).
2. See Summary of Hearings on Debt Collection Practices, National Commission on
Consumer Finance, 88 BANKING L.J. 291 (1971); Berger, The Bill Collector and the
Law, 17 DEPAur. L. REv. 327 (1968); Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics-An
Analysis of the Interests and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1972); Martin, A
Creditor's Liability for Unreasonable Collection Efforts: The Evolution of a Tort in
Texas, 9 S. Te-x. L.J. 127 (1967); Smith & Straske, Collection Procedures and Right of
Privacy, 36 FLA. B.J. 1085 (1962); Comment, Debt Collection Practices: Remedies for
Abuse, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 698 (1969); Comment, Effectively Regulating Extra-
judicial Collection of Debts, 20 MAINE L. Rev. 261 (1968); Note, Credit Transactions-
Debtor and Creditor-improper Collection Practices, 31 N. DAx. L. REv. 277 (1955);
Comment, Recovery for Creditor Harassment, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 950 (1968).
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ing perceptions of the parties.3 The inevitable result of the inability
of either party to assess accurately the optimum means by which any
given conflict should be resolved has been the development of a series
of abusive collection tactics and practices utilized by debt collectors in
attempts to recover outstanding obligations.4
S. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80
YAtr L.J. 1 (1970). Professor Leff suggests increasing the information to both parties
as a means of reducing the transaction costs implicit in coercive collection.
4. The catalogue of abuses is too extensive to relate in full, but some of the more
spectacular examples bear repeating. In Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App.
656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948), an employee of the Carroll Baking Company went to the
home of the Digsbys to collect a $2.00 debt. Mrs. Digsby, who was pregnant, was
home alone. When she informed the collector that she could not pay, he became
boisterous, used vulgar and abusive language, and threatened to take something from
the house to get the $2.00. Mrs. Digsby asked him to leave as she was becoming ill.
The employee responded by saying that if he could not get the money any other
way, he would "take it out in trade," meaning he was going to have sexual intercourse
with Mrs. Digsby. Mrs. Digsby was forced to go to the hospital that day, and her
child was born that night.
A comparable situation arose in Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242
N.W. 25 (1932). Mrs. Barnett was a widow who lived with her two children and
was employed as a saleslady at a dry goods store. She was indebted $28.75 to a coal
company. Collection Service Company, retained to collect the outstanding bill, sent
Mrs. Barnett dunning letters containing such threats as "You will settle your account
with the above through this office within the next five days or we will tie you up
tighter than a drum" and "We will bother [your employer] until he is so disgusted
with you that he will throw you out the back door."
The use of the telephone and the employer of the debtor as instruments of abuse
is illustrated in Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 NE.2d 340 (1956). Mrs. Housh
owed a doctor's bill of $197. The collector, having tricked Mrs. Housh into signing
a coguovit note for $222, proceeded to engage in a series of harassing telephone calls.
He frequently called Mrs. Housh at the school where she was employed; on one
occasion his three calls within fifteen minutes resulted in a threat of her employment
termination. In addition, the collector called the supervisor of music for the Dayton
Public Schools, as well as Mrs. Housh's landlord, claiming that Mrs. Housh did not
pay her bills and inquiring about her income. For a period of about two weeks, he
called Mrs. Housh eight or nine times a day, and as late as 11:45 pm.
A final illustration of the cumulative impact of a repeated pattern of abuse is pro-
vided by Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). General Finance
Company was found liable for engaging in the following harassing activities while
attempting to collect a debt from Mr. and Mrs. Duty:
Daily telephone calls to both Mr. and Mrs. Duty, which extended to
great length; threatening to blacklist them with the Merchants' Retail
Credit Association; accusing them of being deadbeats; talking to them in
a harsh, insinuating, loud voice; stating to their neighbors and employers
that they were deadbeats; asking Mrs. Duty what she was doing with her
money; accusing her of spending money in other ways than in payments
on the loan transaction; threatening to cause both plaintiffs to lose their
jobs unless they made the payments demanded; calling each of the plain-
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The extent of such practices is difficult to determine. When ques-
tioned about their techniques, firms engaging in debt collection univer-
sally report that they have promulgated policies against harassment
in an effort to maintain customer good will.' To the extent that such
statements can be accepted without question, the abusive practices which
do occur must be attributed to overly aggressive individual collectors
possibly concerned with default ratios as a reflection on their job per-
formance. Such collectors, of course, are reluctant to discuss these
practices candidly, making it difficult to measure accurately the extent
of harassment tactics by surveying the collection industry. On the
other hand, compiling accurate empirical data on collection practices
through a consumer sample is equally difficult. Debtors have a tendency
to exaggerate descriptions of contacts made by the debt collector. They
may be acutely sensitive to any collection attempt, no matter how
harmless it might seem to an objective outsider, and their reports may
reflect their resentment.6
tiffs at the respective places of their employment several times daily;
threatening to garnishee their wages; berating plaintiffs to their fellow
employees; requesting their employers to require them to pay; calling on
them at their work; flooding them with a barrage of demand letters, dun
cards, special delivery letters, and telegrams both at their homes and their
places of work; sending them cards bearing this opening statement:
"Dear Customer: We made you a loan because we thought that you were
honest."; sending telegrams and special delivery letters to them at ap-
proximately midnight, causing them to be awakened from their sleep; call-
ing a neighbor in the disguise of a sick brother of one of the plaintiffs,
and on another occasion as a stepson; calling Mr. Duty's mother at her
place of employment in Wichita Falls long distance, collect; leaving red
cards in their door, with insulting notes on the back and thinly-veiled
threats; calling Mr. Duty's brother long distance, collect, in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, at his residence at a cost to him in excess of $11, and harangu-
ing him about the alleged balance owed by plaintiffs.
273 S XV.2d at 65.
5. Homburger, Harassment of Borrowers by Licensed Lenders, 1 COLum. JL,. &
Soc. PRoB. 39 (1965).
6. The only comprehensive effort to measure harassment techniques through a con-
sumer sample has been by Professor Caplovitz in a study entitled Debtors in Default.
His survey consisted of a series of questions concerning creditor harassment to which
debtors in four cities (Philadelphia, Detroit, New York, and Chicago) were asked to
respond. Twenty-eight percent of the debtors reported receiving "insulting" letters;
15 percent reported the use of abusive and obscene language in communications by
creditors; 16 percent replied that creditors had either threatened to contact or actually
contacted friends and relatives; and 36 percent reported that creditors had contacted
their employers. 2 D. Caplovitz, Debtors in Default 10-2 to 10-9 (June 1971) (pub-
lished by the Columbia University Bureau of Research).
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Those engaging in debt collection should be entitled to a presump-
tion of regularity in view of the absence of data revealing the true ex-
tent of offensive collection practices. It may be assumed that the great
majority of all lending institutions, credit sellers, and collection agen-
cies employ acceptable methods in their attempts to encourage the
debtor to pay.7 Nevertheless, in today's credit-oriented society, atten-
tion must be directed toward the small minority of firms involved in
coercive and overreaching activities. With over $180 billion of credit
currently outstanding" and an average per capita indebtedness of $900,
it is reasonable to assume that few consumers are untouched by the
credit industry. Since credit plays such a major role in consumer trans-
actions, it is vital that collection practices be effectively regulated.
The regulation, however, must be undertaken with a basic under-
standing of the dynamics of consumer credit. The current rates for
credit reflect, among other factors, collection costs. If strict limitations
are placed on collection practices, rates presumably will rise. Further-
more, if debt collection becomes too costly a process, at some point it
will be more profitable to reduce costs by restricting the availability
of credit to low-income, high-risk consumers. The effect of regulation
would then be to deny credit altogether to that group of marginal con-
sumers whom the regulation initially was designed to protect. There
remains, nonetheless, a need to deter callous debt collectors from en-
gaging in unjustifiably injurious activities. Thus, the fundamental prob-
lem is of perceiving, in the absence of compelling empirical data, the
optimum means by which outrageous collection practices can be re-
stricted without creating an equally injurious imbalance in the credit
system. Traditional efforts to control abuse have proceeded along two
parallel lines of development.
The most highly developed approach has been the judicial expansion
of traditional tort remedies to fit the particular circumstances of abusive
collection practices.' Tort theories recognized as providing a basis of
7. Professor Caplovitz found that harassment was more typical of certain types of
creditors than others. Collection agencies and small loan companies were the largest
offenders; finance companies and low-income retailers were close to the average of
harassment for the sample; banks, general retailers, and credit unions were below the
average. Id. at 10-40.
8. See note 1 supra.
9. See generally Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics-An Analysis of the Interests
and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
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recovery for various types of abuse include defamation, 10 invasion of
privacy," intentional infliction of emotional distress,"2 interference with
contractual relations,' 3 and abuse of process.' 4 The primary difficulty
with this approach has been the considerable latitude it leaves creditors
to act in debt collection situations without incurring liability. This is
10. The tort of defamation applies in the consumer-debtor context only if it can be
demonstrated that publication of false matter by the creditor resulted in pecuniary
injury. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 345 S.W.2d 34
(1961); Blyther v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 182 A.2d 892 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1962); Ragland v. Household Fin. Co, 254 Iowa 976, 119 N.W.2d 788 (1963); Fennell
v. G.A.C. Corp., 242 Md. 209, 218 A.2d 492 (1966); Hinlde v. Alexander, 244 Ore.
267, 417 P.2d 586 (1966); Weaver v. Beneficial Fin. Co, 200 Va. 572, 106 S.E.2d 620
(1959).
11. See, e.g., Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961);
Bowden v. Spiegal, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950); Carey v. Statewide
Fin. Co., 3 Conn. Cir. 716, 223 A.2d 405 (1966); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Callaway, 224
Ga. 367, 162 S.E.2d 430 (1968); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956);
Mills v. First Nat'l Credit Bureau, Inc., 192 NE.2d 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); Tollefson
v. Price, 247 Ore. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967) (publication of overdue payment in news-
paper). Generally, recovery in the cited cases has been based upon the theory that
public disclosure of private facts by a debt collector constitutes an invasion of pri-
vacy. See generally W. PROSSER, Trm LAw OF ToRTs § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
12. This tort theory was developed to permit recovery for outrageous conduct
undertaken willfully or intentionally through acts producing emotional or mental in-
jury. Initially, the ability to recover was severely restricted by the imposition of a
requirement that there be resulting physical injuries, but this obstacle to recovery has
been largely eroded in recent cases. See, e.g., First Natl City Bank v. Gonzalez, 293
F.2d 919 (Ist Cir. 1961); Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d
203 (1948); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963). Two cases
illustrative of the kind of abuse which clearly justifies recovery are Gadbury v. Bleitz,
133 Wash. 134, 233 P. 299 (1925), in which the creditor kept the body of the debtor's
son and refused to cremate it until the debtor paid for a previous funeral, and Kirby
v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936), in which the creditor's
threat to have the debtor arrested and his calling her a deadbeat resulted in her pre-
mature delivery of a dead child.
13. Generally, this tort requires the existence of a contract between the debtor and
a third party, knowledge of that fact by the creditor, an intention to induce a breach
of the contract, and a resultant breach. In essence, evidence is required, for example,
that the creditor's objective was to cause the debtor's employer to discharge him.
See, e.g., Hill Grocery Co. v. Carroll, 233 Ala. 376, 136 So. 789 (1931); Long v.
Newby, 488 P.2d 719 (Alas. 1971); Warschauser v. Brooklyn Furniture Co., 159 App.
Div. 81, 144 N.Y.S. 257 (1913); Birl v. Philadelphia Elec. Co, 402 Pa. 297, 167 A.2d
472 (1960).
14. This tort requires a misuse of legal process to accomplish an improper ulterior
purpose, specifically, the collection of a private debt. Typically, it is applied where
the creditor utilizes criminal process in order to coerce payment. See, e.g., Cline v.
Flagler Sales Corp., 207 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968); Huggins v. Winn-Dixie
Greenville, Inc, 249 S.C. 206, 153 SZE.2d 693 (1967); Mullins v. Sanders, 189 Va. 624,
54 SE.2d 116 (1949).
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but an obvious consequence of the effort to apply legal theories which
had their geneses in completely different contexts. In addition, the
existence of ill-defined and somewhat inapplicable theories of tortious
liability has resulted in a distressing inconsistency of application. This
inconsistency is found not only in the unwillingness of some courts to
apply a given theory of recovery to an abusive debt collection but more
significantly in the inability of factfinders to perceive a cohesive and
comprehensive standard to which a given behavior pattern and its con-
sequences can be applied.
Traditional tort theory suffers from additional disabilities. Initially,
the debtor faces the problem of proving the requisite intent. To estab-
lish interference with the employment relationship, for example, the
consumer must demonstrate that the collector intended to induce the
contract breach, that is, the loss of the job." In an action for emotional
distress, the debtor must show more than that he or she suffered dis-
tress as a result of the collector's intentionally employed practices; it
must be established that the collector intended the mental distress. 0
Moreover, beyond questions of intent, the debtor ultimately must satis-
fy the requirement that measurable damages be shown. Conduct by a
collector may be reprehensible, yet the consumer may be unable to
demonstrate damage. In a suit for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, for example, some courts require that the plaintiff show some
physical manifestation of the injury in order to recover.17
A final obstacle facing a consumer seeking redress for wrongful col-
lection activities by means of a tort action is the burden of overcom-
ing the defenses permitted the collector in a number of situations. If
a consumer brings a defamation action because the debt collector has
published the fact that the debt was owing, the collector may defend
by asserting the truth of the publication.' 8 In actions for invasion of
privacy, where consent is a defense, some courts have held that by
entering into a debt agreement the consumer has consented to a subse-
quent invasion by a party to the agreement.' 9 Such defenses, despite
their obvious appeal in traditional tort litigation, do much to insulate
15. See note 13 supra.
16. See note 12 supra.
17. See, e.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Berrier v. Beneficial Fin., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ind. 1964); Turner v. ABC
Jalousie Co., 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528 (1968); Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641,
254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
18. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
19. E.g., Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957).
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the overzealous debt collector from having to answer for what may be
unjustified practices.
The failure of existing tort theories to provide either party with suf-
ficient awareness of permissible standards of conduct and the general
recognition of the inability of such theories to control abusive debt
collection have led to the development, in at least one state, of a new
debt collection tort.20 Although such developments are to be applauded,
there remains a serious question regarding the capacity of diverse state
courts to formulate any coherent and viable theory of recovery within
any reasonable period of time.2 It is this fundamental concern with
the ability of developing tort theory to deal adequately with a problem
requiring a delicate balancing of interests which necessitates an exami-
nation of an alternative approach, which involves comprehensive legis-
lation.
A review of existing state and federal legislation reveals a paucity of
effective measures dealing with creditor harassment.22 There are, for
example, a number of individual federal statutes which conceivably
can be employed to control specific aspects of collection abuse, includ-
ing the mail fraud statute,23 proscriptions against use of the telephone
20. United Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bain, 393 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See
generally Comment, Recovery for Creditor Harassment, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 950 (1968).
21. A perhaps not totally inappropriate analogy may be found in the development
of strict products liability as a distinct tort theory unbridled by the perceived restric-
tions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Even with the impetus of Dean Prosser's
famous article on privity, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
smner), 69 YALn L.J. 1099 (1960), combined with Justice Traynor's majority opinion
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962), and the subsequent adoption of RESTATEiMENT (SEcoi) OF TORTS 5 402A
(1966), the field of products liability remains a morass of inconsistency between ju-
dicial and statutory theories of recovery.
22. See generally Sumnary of Hearings on Debt Collection Practices, National Com-
mission on Consmer Finance, 88 BANxING L.J. 291 (1971).
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (1970). Section 1341 provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of,
loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure
for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to
be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or au-
thorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered
by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it
1974]
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in interstate communications to annoy or harass,2 4 and the prohibition
of utilization of the name or initials of a federal agency to convey the
false impression that such agency is involved in collection of a debt.0
These statutes, however, apply only to a narrow range of creditor
abuses in the collection process, and their efficacy is further hampered
by the fact that they were never intended to provide a means of con-
trolling abusive debt collection.26 Legislative remedies at the state level
is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
Recovery under this section for abusive collection is available only under a limited
set of circumstances. The essential elements of proof of a violation are the existence
of a scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining of money by means of false pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, and the use of the United States mails in further-
ance of the scheme. Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1970). Section 223 of the Communications Act makes it a
crime to use the telephone in interstate communications to make "repeated telephone
calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to harass any person at the called
number," or knowingly to permit others to use a telephone under one's control for
such purpose. Penalties for violation of section 223 are a fine up to $500, or six months'
imprisonment, or both. In addition, tariffs of telephone companies filed pursuant to
section 203 of the Communications Act forbid use of an interstate telephone service
"for a call or calls, anonymous or otherwise, if in a manner reasonably to be expected
to frighten, abuse, torment, or harass another," or for calls that "interfere unreasonably
with the use of the service by one or more other customers." Id. § 203. Violations
are subject to various enforcement proceedings under the Act. See id. H§ 401, 411;
Federal Communications Commission Notice No. 70-609 (1970).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 712 (1970). The statute provides:
Whoever, being engaged in the business of collecting or aiding in the
collection of private debts or obligations, or being engaged in furnishing
private police, investigation, or other private detective services, uses as
part of the firm name of such business, or employs in any communication,
correspondence, notice, advertisement, or circular the words "national",
"Federal", or "United States", the initials "U.S.", or any emblem, insignia,
or name, for the purpose of conveying and in a manner reasonably calcu-
Iated to convey the false impression that such business is a department,
agency, bureau, or instrumentality of the United States or in any manner
represents the United States, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or im-
prisoned not more than one year, or both.
In United States v. Boneparth, 456 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972), the court sharply limited
the scope of this provision by holding that a credit seller collecting his own debts is
beyond its purview. But see CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CoDE § 6853 (West 1964), deeming
such a party to be a collection agency.
26. The only federal statute designed specifically to provide a comprehensive regu-
lation of collection practices is Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1970), which regulates strong-arm collection tactics arising out of
extortionate credit transactions. The statute is limited in its application, however, to
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are somewhat more extensive than existing federal controls. 7 State
legislation typically includes licensing requirements, 28 together with
various provisions restricting the use of abusive or harassing communi-
cations,29 prohibiting the simulation of legal process,3 ° and proscribing
any conduct likely to produce a breach of the peace.31 Nevertheless,
in the absence of a coherent state or federal regulatory model,32 the
problem of behavioral control remains largely unsolved. Any effort to
utilize existing state or federal statutory remedies to accomplish pur-
poses for which they were not intended produces an inconsistency of
application which induces a modification in the methods of abuse or
harassment rather than a modification in the behavior itself.
Against this background, there have been recent efforts, particularly
in the context of uniform statutory proposals, to develop a coherent
and comprehensive legislative response to the problem of abusive col-
lection. An analysis of these proposed statutory models reveals some of
the difficulties inherent in accomplishing this goal. For example, the
loan sharks who make usurious loans and then utilize extortion to enforce collection.
Most abusive collection practices which affect the marginal consumer are clearly be-
yond the scope of this statute.
27. A number of states have enacted provisions which regulate, in some form, the
operation of collection agencies. See generally 1 CCH POVERTY L. REP. 3700 3720
(1972). The difficulty lies not in the total absence of such provisions but in the general
failure to articulate a unified regulation of the full range of abusive collection prac-
tices. In addition, there is a wide variation in the effectiveness of the enforcement
devices under these provisions. See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1053 (Supp. 1973)
(license revocation); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 118 (West 1962) (loss of license);
COLO. REv. STAT. AN~r. § 27-1-25(e) (Supp. 1967) (private action for damages).
28. See I CCH POVERTY L. REP. 3700 (1972). The California collection agency law
requires licensing of the agency and its employees and requires an annual examination
and audit of the licensee's account. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6850-6956.2 (West
1964). In Idaho, collection agencies must obtain a permit in order to conduct business
and employees must be licensed. IDAno CODE § 26-2223 (Supp. 1973). See also NEVADA
REv. STAT. § 649.075 (1969); VA. CoDE ANN. § 54-729.2 to -729.24 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
29. See I CCFI PovERry L. REP. 3720 (1972).
30. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 27-1-25 (Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.38
(1965); IND. ANN. StAT. § 10-5008 (Supp. 1973); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-353 (Supp.
1974).
31. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8 630 (Repl. Vol. 1957). See generally I CCH POVERTY
L. REP. 3720 (1972).
32. Several states have enacted more or less comprehensive debt collection legisla-
tion. See, e.g., ARIM. REV. SrAT. ANN. §§ 32-1002 to -1057 (Supp. 1973); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §5 573-583 (Supp. 1973); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93, §5 24-28,
49 (1972); NVis. STAT. ANNi. §§ 427.101-.105 (1973). But even these statutes suffer from
significant limitations. The Arizona statute, for example, exempts from certain of its
proscriptions persons engaged in collecting debts arising out of their own business.
Aruz. REv. StAT. ANN. § 32-1021D (Supp. 1973).
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Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), which has been adopted in
seven states, contains a provision prohibiting "unconscionable conduct
in the collection of debts." 33 Apart from problems posed by the failure
to specify standards of behavior, this provision is enforceable only by
the state administrator, not the aggrieved consumer, and only through
the injunctive process, not damages.3 The capability of such a vague
statutory proscription with its severely limited remedy to control
abusive collection procedures is doubtful. On the other hand, pro-
posals for regulating debt collection contained in the National Con-
sumer Act (NCA) 35 reflect the general failure of that proposed statute
adequately to consider the necessity of balancing the relevant interests
with sufficient precision to prevent a forced withdrawal of the poor
consumer from the credit market. The NCA contains restrictions which
would, in many cases, prevent any extrajudicial efforts to resolve col-
lection disputes and is, therefore, subject to the criticism that it would
merely increase the transaction costs eventually borne by the con-
sumer.
36
33. UNW oRM CoNsUMER CREDIT CoDE § 6.111 (1) (c) (1968) provides: "The Adminis-
trator may bring a civil action to restrain a creditor or a person acting in his behalf
from engaging in a course of . . . fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in the col-
lection of debts arising from consumer credit sales, consumer leases or consumer loans."
34. Id. In order to grant relief under this provision, a court must find that the
creditor has engaged or is likely to engage in a course of fraudulent or unconscionable
conduct, that such conduct has or is likely to cause injury to consumers, and that the
creditor has caused or will be able to cause injury primarily because the transactions
involved are credit transactions. Id. § 6.111(2).
35. NATIoNAL CONSUMER Acr §9 7.101-.303 (First Final Draft 1970) [hereinafter
cited as NCA]. In form, the NCA provisions on debt collection are relatively straight
forward, containing a laundry list of proscribed practices (id. §9 7.201-.208), including
the practice of law. by debt collectors; collection through threats or coercion; un-
reasonable harassment or abuse in collection attempts; unreasonable publication of the
indebtedness; fraudulent or misleading representations in collection attempts; and un-
fair or unconscionable means of collection. The difficulty with the statute, however,
lies in the broad and all-inclusive manner in which such practices are defined. Its
prohibitions include accusations which, if true, would tend to disgrace the debtor or
subject him to society's ridicule or contempt (id. § 7.202(2)); the placing of telephone
calls without disclosing the caller's identity (id. § 7.203(2)); and the communication
of any information related to an indebtedness to the debtor's employer or to any other
person through a means other than legal process, regardless of the circumstance (Id.
H9 7.204(1), (2)). Although the statute reflects the laudable objective of a pervasive
regulation designed to eliminate all abusive collection practices, it suffers from the
criticism that, by failing to delimit more carefully the truly abusive practices, it has
the effect of eliminating most, if not all, extrajudicial collection efforts, thereby sig-
nificantly increasing transaction costs.
36. A further difficulty with the NCA in terms of its enactment into law lies with
the broad and unrestricted powers granted the state administrator to establish rules
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A slightly amended version of the NCA chapter on debt collection
has been promulgated in the Model Consumer Credit Act (MCCA) .7
Although the remedies available against an abusive creditor have been
more carefully delimited, the MCCA, like the UCCC and the NCA,
suffers from the absence of a standard of conduct reflecting a carefully
drawn balance between the competing interests of debtor and creditor.
A more positive statutory model is the recently enacted Wisconsin
Consumer Act3 8 This statute, conceived as a compromise between the
UCCC and the NCA, contains provisions on debt collection reflecting
a greater concern for the necessity of permitting some forms of extra-
judicial debtor-creditor contact in order to promote nonadjudicative
dispute settlement."
A generalized deficiency of all these statutes appears to lie in the
absence of any articulated sense of the purpose of debt collection
and regulations proscribing other conduct deemed in violation of the statute. Id.
5 7.209. Although this again reflects a laudable objective, that of attempting to increase
the statute's flexibility of response to the ability of creditors to devise additional
abusive practices, such provision limits to a significant degree the creditor's ability to
pattern his collection activities in reliance upon the predictability of proscribed prac-
tices. It may be assumed that such administrative latitude will leave the statute par-
ticularly vulnerable to industry criticism.
37. MODEL CONSUMER CrEDIT Acr §§ 6.101-.303 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MCCA].
The MCCA modifies the NCA debt collection provisions by eliminating the power
of the administrator to define additional proscribed practices through regulation and
by limiting the enforcement provisions to a right of action for damages. Compare
NCA §§ 7.301-.303 ,with MCCA § 8.108. In addition, the MCCA adds the requirement
that every debt collector provide the consumer, prior to any collection attempt, with
a description in writing of the legal relationship between the debt collector and the
previous creditor. MCCA § 6.301.
38. 1V1s. STAT. ANN. §§ 427.101-.105 (1973).
39. The Wisconsin Consumer Act evidences far more than the NCA or the MCCA
an effort to balance the desire to curb abusive collection practices with the recognition
of the legitimate interest of the creditor in nonadjudicatory dispute settlement. Thus,
although in form it proceeds by establishing a list of proscribed practices (id. §
427.104), the range of the practices is carefully delimited to conduct intended to abuse,
harass, or defraud, and the nature of the conduct proscribed is specified with par-
ticularity. There are, for example, no provisions regarding subjection of the debtor to
"ridicule" or social "contempt," or prohibiting "unfair" practices. In addition, sig-
nificant extrajudicial contacts are permitted under carefully prescribed conditions. For
example, the collector is permitted to contact the debtor's employer for the purpose
of verifying employment status or earnings or where the employer has an established
debt counseling service. Id. § 427.104(d). Additionally, contact with third persons
regarding the debt is permitted unless the collector is aware that such person does not
have a legitimate business need for the information. Id. § 427.104(e). Finally, threats
of legal action constitute a violation only if the action is not taken in regular course
or is not intended with respect to the particular debt. Id. § 427.104().
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legislation. There is need for a comprehensive statute setting forth
with a degree of particularity those collection practices which go be-
yond the bounds of public acceptance and informing the consumer of
the availability of redress in the event such practices are employed.
Such a statute should establish standards which protect the debtor frcm
abusive collection practices but which do not overly restrict collection
efforts to the extent that the marginal consumer's access to the credit
market is seriously impaired. The balancing of competing interests is
not a prophylactic concession to the political process statutory pro-
posals must negotiate; rather, it results from recognition that the pur-
pose of the legislation is narrowly confined to an attempt to modify
debt collection behavior in the context of the complex economic status of
the interest which the statute seeks to protect. Ultimately, therefore, the
problem becomes one of defining the point at which the interest of the
creditor in effective means of collection, as well as that of the con-
sumer in free access to the credit market, must yield to the debtor's
right to be free from unconscionable practices in debt collection.
11. A PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE
One of the difficulties with existing legislative proposals to control
abusive debt collection practices has been that the effort to provide
uniform statutory treatment has removed the solution from the realities
in which it is designed to operate: a particular state with its preexisting
statutory and judicial approach to the debtor-creditor relationship. The
following proposed statute, therefore, has been deliberately drafted with
specific reference to the existing law of a single state. Virginia has been
chosen primarily because of the authors' familiarity but also because it
is reasonably representative of jurisdictions which heretofore have paid
little or no attention to the specific problem of abusive collection
practices.
To the extent statutory standards regulating debt collection activities
currently exist at all in Virginia, they exist through specialized licensing
legislation requiring that all collection agencies be licensed. 4 The Vir-
ginia Collection Agency Board4' has issued rules and regulations govern-
ing the conduct of licensed agencies.4 2 These regulations are of limited
scope, however, and are incapable of reaching the activities of debt col-
40. VA. CopY AN.N. § 54-729.3 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
41. See id. § 54-729.4.
42. Va. Col. Agency Bd., Rules & Regulations (Sept. 1970).
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lectors not licensed under the statute, including small loan companies
and credit sellers who undertake their own collection.43
Other statutory provisions in Virginia of potential utility in restrict-
ing abusive collection practices include the "insulting words statute,"
which makes actionable all words tending to produce a breach of the
peace;44 a prohibition of abusive or indecent language over the tele-
phone; a statute forbidding threats of death or bodily injury to a per-
son or member of his family;46 and a section proscribing the simulation
of legal process.47 Unfortunately, because of the general nature of
these sections, they are not easily cognizable by debt collectors or con-
sumers as effective limitations on collection practices. These random
provisions thus fall short of constituting the unified regulation neces-
sary to afford adequate notice and effective remedy.
A. Scope of the Regulation
Any attempt to develop a comprehensive regulation of debt collec-
tion requires a resolution of the appropriate scope and coverage of the
statute in terms of the types of transactions to be encompassed, as well
as a delineation of the extent of control within that framework. In
dealing with these questions, a fundamental determination has been
made to bring within the regulatory model only those practices which
are utilized in efforts to collect debts arising from consumer credit
transactions. 48 This determination is based upon a series of unstartling
assumptions. Initially, it is believed that the private consumer is most
vulnerable to abusive practices. The marginal consumer model, which
is a principal focus of the legislation, assumes an individual generally
43. Such lending institutions are licensed or certified under other legislation. See
VA. CODE AqN. 55 6.1-244 to -310 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (Small Loan Act); id. §§ 6.1-195.1
to -195.76 (Savings and Loan Act); id. § 6.1-196 to -226 (credit unions); id. §§ 6.1-227
to -243 (industrial loan associations). These statutes, however, do not speak to debt
collection practices.
44, id. f 8-630 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
45. Id. 5 18.1-238 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
46. Id. ! 18.1-257.
47. Id. § 18.1-313.
48. The scope of the proposed statute is essentially identical to that of the Wis-
consin Consumer Act, Wis. StAT. AN. §§ 427.103, 421.301(13), (17) (1973), in limit-
ing its provisions to cases where the debt arises for "personal, family, household, or
agricultural purposes." See Appendix infra, § 2(c) & accompanying Comment. The
National Consumer Act, on the other hand, includes within the purview of its restric-
tions on debt collection activities a noncorporate business debtor who acquires equip-
ment for use in his business. NCA § 1.301 (8) (a).
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inexperienced and unsophisticated in commercial transactions and hav-
ing a comparatively low level of education.49 To the extent these char-
acteristics prevail, the debtor will be unaware of his legal status and
unwilling or unable to undertake any positive action to protect it.
More significantly, he frequently will believe that since the debt is
owing, there are no limitations on the conduct of the creditor in his
efforts to collect the obligation. The exclusion from the coverage of
the legislation of commercial dealings between creditors and business
debtors does not rest upon the assumption that such transactions are
free from abusive collection practices; rather, it is assumed that such
parties have sufficient access to existing means of nonadjudicatory dis-
pute settlement to produce a relative parity in their bargaining positions.
Within the context of consumer credit transactions, however, it is
intended that the statute be broad in its regulatory reach. The chapter
is directed toward the activities of all persons engaging in debt col-
lection, whether they be licensed collectors, employees of credit sellers,
or lending institutions, and whether or not collection is a primary func-
tion of their organization."° If all who collect debts are bound by the
same regulatory code, the aspect of competitive advantage is removed
from abusive practices, and with it goes some of the incentive to en-
gage in such activities. Furthermore, the existence of a single set of
standards to control all debt collectors would increase the likelihood
of consumer awareness of such controls.
The statute is also intended to apply regardless of the subject matter
of the consumer credit transaction or the amount of the debt. In the
context of controlling offensive collection activities, there appears to
be little justification for distinguishing among transactions involving
goods, services, realty, or money. The potential for abuse in collection
exists regardless of the nature of the original credit transaction from
which the claim arose 1- On essentially the same rationale, the statute
does not include a monetary limit for covered transactions. The Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) 2 may be compared to the model
legislation in this respect. The CCPA, in providing for disclosure of
49. See generally 2 D. Caplovitz, supra note 6, at 10-18 to 10-22.
50. See Appendix infra, § 2(e) & accompanying Comment. The inclusion of all
those who engage in debt collection activities, whether directly or indirectly, is con-
sistent with NCA § 7.103(3) and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 427.103(3) (1973).
51. See Appendix infra, § 2(b) & accompanying Comment. This definition is de-
rived from NCA § 1.301 (10).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681 (1970).
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credit terms, exempts from its coverage credit transactions, other than
real property, in excess of $25,000.53 Disclosure is required to avoid
the uninformed use of credit and to encourage comparative evaluation
of credit terms. It is reasonable to assume that consumers entering
personal property transactions in excess of $25,000 are informed about
the use of credit and are in a position to compare available terms;
hence, such an exemption is justified. A monetary exclusion is un-
warranted, however, in the context of a debt collection statute, since
the amount of the debt owing should not be relevant in determining
the appropriate methods by which collection may be undertaken.
B. Prohibited Collection Practices
There are two basic drafting approaches which can be utilized in
regulating collection practices. The first method is to specify the per-
missible activities which can be employed by a debt collector, requiring
him to seek adjudicatory relief if such self-help attempts fail to produce
a recovery. The alternative approach is to list proscribed practices and
provide a remedy for violations. The permissive approach has the ad-
vantage of providing clear standards of conduct under which both
creditor and debtor are aware of the limits of acceptable conduct. In
addition, this approach minimizes the possibility of a debt collector
devising an abusive collection tactic not appearing on a list of pro-
scribed practices. It is, however, difficult, if not impossible, to compile
an exhaustive list of acceptable debt collection activities. An incom-
plete list could prove unduly restrictive and result either in an un-
acceptable increase in the cost of credit or an equally unacceptable
limitation on free entry into the credit market. To avoid these conse-
quences, the proposed statute adopts the alternative approach of pro-
viding a "laundry list" of the most offensive collection practices, 4
with remedies for victims of such conduct.5 Although there is a risk
that debt collectors will develop new methods of coercion not en-
compassed within the regulation, this approach eliminates the most
abusive collection activities, while permitting the majority of debt col-
lectors to continue to utilize reasonable extrajudicial collection practices.
The proscribed practices are specified in section 3 of the statute."6
Section 3 (a), prohibiting collectors from threatening litigation, is in-
53. Id. § 1603(3).
54. See Appendix infra, § 3 & accompanying Comment.
55. See id. § 4 & accompanying Comment.
56. See id. § 3 & accompanying Comment. Proscribed practices under other pro-
posed statutory models are discussed in notes 33-39 supra & accompanying text.
1974]
NVILLIAMN, AND MARY LAW REVIEW
cluded more for the benefit of collectors than the protection of con-
sumers.57 Regulation XI, 2 of the Virginia Collection Agency Board,
promulgated in 1970, proscribes threatening litigation and subjects a
collector to the possibility of a license revocation for such a practice.
In addition, threatening litigation for the collection of debts violates
the Virginia prohibition against the practice of law without a license,5"
in light of the ruling of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee
of the Virginia State Bar that such activity by debt collectors consti-
tutes the practice of law.59 This provision is included in the proposed
chapter on debt collection for purposes of unity and to provide further
notice to collectors that threatening litigation to collect a debt is for-
bidden by law.
Debt collectors are barred from using methods of communication
that simulate legal process under section 3 (b).'6O This section merely
incorporates existing law6' into the debt collection chapter for reasons
of unity and notice. Writings presently forbidden for purposes of col-
lecting money include those resembling warrants, writs, process, mo-
tions for judgment, and notices of execution liens. 2 All such com-
munications are likewise prohibited under this chapter.
Section 3 (c) prevents the collector from coercing payment through
deception concerning his business status,63 particularly through the use
of such devices as insignias, emblems, and initials other than those of
the collector. This provision is designed primarily to prevent the de-
ceptive practice of inducing consumer belief that a governmental entity
has become involved in the transaction. Acting under such belief,
debtors may choose to waive possible defenses to the validity of the
debt rather than assert them against the government. In Floershehz v.
FTC,'4 for example, the court enforced an order that a Los Angeles
firm cease and desist mailing bills from "The Washington Building,
Washington, D.C." on the ground that the practice was designed to
57. A similar provision appears in section 6(a) of the Model Act to License and
Regulate Collection Agencies, drafted by the ABA National Conference of Lawyers
and Collection Agencies and reported in 70 Com. L.J. 38, 39 (1965).
58. VA. CODE ANN. S 54-44 (RepL. Vol. 1972).
59. Opinion No. 38, Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, 30 VA. ST. B. RP.
34, 36 (1968).
60. See Appendix infra, § 3 (b) & accompanying Comment.
61. VA. CoDE AwNr. § 18.1-313 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
62. Id.
63. See Appendix infra, § 3 (c) & accompanying Comment.
64. 411 F.2d 874 (9th Cit. 1969).
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exploit the assumption of many low income debtors that anything
emanating from Washington signifies government involvement.65 The
Federal Trade Commission has issued guides66 against debt collection
deception which include a requirement of disclosure of purpose67 and
a prohibition against false implication of government affiliation." This
collection deception also is restricted under federal law providing
criminal liability for any person who uses initials, emblems, or insignias
in a manner falsely indicating the involvement of a federal depart-
ment.', These prohibitions are recognized in this provision and made
applicable to purely local activities.
In addition to speaking to situations where correspondence suggests
government involvement, section 3(c) prohibits misrepresentations of
the identity of the collector. Existing Virginia statutes provide crimi-
nal sanctions for impersonating an officer of the peace"0 and for the
unauthorized use of a police officer's uniform.71 Section 3(c) would
provide further notice of these provisions, as well as affording a remedy
to the debtor who is misled by a collector engaging in such unlawful
practices. Allowing private recovery for such acts further underscores
the preventive policy of the statute by strengthening the enforcement
potential.
Section 3 (d) protects the consumer, his family, and his property from
violence or threats of violence.72 Although such practices are pro-
scribed by existing statutes in Virginia, 3 this provision, as well as others
dealing with currently prohibited practices, is included in order to create
a unified body of standards and to provide a private remedy for those
victimized. Threats of violence are prohibited not only because of
the potential for physical or emotional injury to the consumer but also
because of the possibility that debtors may be induced by fear into
paying invalid claims. The abuse inherent in such practices is particu-
larly acute in cases where the consumer has a valid defense which he
relinquishes because of creditor coercion. Moreover, even if a claim
is valid, the debtor has the right to be free from such threats. In an
65. Id. at 877.
66. 16 C.F.R. §§ 237.0-.6 (1973).
67. Id. § 237.2.
68. Id. § 273.3.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 712 (1970).
70. VA. CODE AN. § 18.1-311 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
71. Id. § 18.1-312.
72. See Appendix infra, § 3 (d) & accompanying Comment.
73. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-184, -257 (RepI. Vol. 1960).
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early Virginia case, Mitchell v. Commonwealth,74 it was held that the
guilt or innocence of an extortion victim is irrelevant. Similarly, the
question of liability on the obligation should not affect the debtor's
right to be free from physical harm.
Section 3 (e) bars the use of obscene language in communication with
the customer or a related person through the mail, over the telephone,
or in person.75 This section incorporates a number of existing pro-
visions under which such language is proscribed, making them spe-
cifically applicable in the debt collection context and furnishing a
private remedy. Virginia Code section 8-630 provides: "All words
which from their usual construction and common acceptation are con-
strued as insults and tend to violence and breach of the peace shall be
actionable." 76 This statute is applicable to written as well as oral com-
munication,77 and criminal punishment is provided by statute.78 In ad-
dition, Virginia Code section 18.1-238 provides: "If any person shall
curse or abuse anyone or use vulgar, profane or indecent language over
any telephone in this State, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."7
Without doubt, some debtors are unwilling to pay just claims even
though they have the financial ability to do so, and there would perhaps
be little inclination to strengthen existing legislation for their benefit.
Nevertheless, the ability to pay should not be a relevant con-
sideration in this context, and the proposed provision should be
included to protect any debtor and his family from verbal abuse caus-
ing humiliation and emotional distress. Furthermore, a great many
debtors fail to make payments because of financial stress caused by
factors ultimately beyond their control. It is manifestly unreasonable
to submit these individuals to unnecessary distress, and the need for
legislation to operate in such circumstances is apparent.
Regulating the content of communication between debtor and credi-
tor is a necessary adjunct to controlling collection practices. Such
regulation, however, does not provide protection against abuses arising
out of the mere fact of communication itself. A number of courts have
recognized a right of action for invasion of privacy and mental anguish
74. 75 Va. 856 (1880).
75. See Appendix infra, § 3 (e) & accompanying Comment.
76. VA. CODE Am. S 8-630 (Repi. Vol. 1957).
77. Chaffin v. Lynch, 83 Va. 106, 1 S.E. 803 (1887).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-255 (Repl. Vol. 1960) (fine not less than $2.50 nor more
than $500).
79. Id. § 18.1-238.
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in the debt collection context resulting from harassing communications.
Damages have been awarded a debtor who received numerous phone
calls at home and work from a collection agency, 0 and recovery has
been granted against a creditor who visited the debtor at the restaurant
where she worked and followed her around shouting in an abusive
manner."' Finally, an action has been allowed where the lenders em-
ployed various devices, including daily phone calls to the debtors, a
flood of demand letters, and long distance collect calls to relatives.82
All of these situations would be barred by section 3 (f) of the pro-
posed chapter.8 3 In addition, the clause, "in such a manner as can rea-
sonably be expected to harass," would include circumstances where the
communication, though not making reference to the debt, was designed
to annoy and cause distress.8 4
The vague standards provided in section 3 (f) can be criticized for
failing to provide adequate notice. Questions of how frequent is too
frequent and of what manner might reasonably harass raise problems
of case-by-case determination of abusive practices. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to devise more specific standards which would effectively con-
trol reprehensible conduct in varying contexts. In defense of this pro-
vision, it may be noted that a role of the courts is to reflect contempo-
rary standards of fair conduct, and an admittedly imprecise section
such as this provides just such an opportunity. The language employed
is intended to afford adequate notice to collectors that they must exer-
cise prudence in their collection attempts in view of the latitude af-
forded the judiciary. It is believed that the collector can exercise proper
judgment in determining how often to call and what to say, while re-
taining a viable collection tactic.
Section 3 (g) prohibits the collector from revealing information con-
cerning a claim to persons other than those liable for the debt.s5 The
judgment implicit in this provision is that the collection of a debt
through extrajudicial settlement should be exclusively the concern of
the debtor and creditor. An overly zealous collector may well attempt
80. Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
81. Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).
82. Duty v. General Fin. Co, 154 Texas 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
83. See Appendix infra, § 3 (f) & accompanying Comment.
84. See id. Such a situation arose in Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc, 272 Ala. 174,
132 So. 2d 321 (1961), where the creditor's agent, a woman, called the debtor's wife
and sister-in-law and suggested to them that an illicit relationship existed between her
(the agent) and the debtor.
85. See Appendix infra, § 3 (g) & accompanying Comment.
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to coerce payment by contacting neighbors, co-workers, and em-
ployers.86 This section is designed to protect these individuals from be-
coming involved in the transaction; but, more importantly, it seeks to
avoid situations where a debtor may be coerced into waiving defenses
to prevent further disclosure of the debt to third parties, whether that
coercion emanates from the debtors' desire to protect the third party
or to protect his own interest.
A further problem arises where it is the debtor's spouse who is
harassed with frequent or abusive communications concerning the debt.
The spouse, in many situations, is unable to do anything to effect re-
payment yet may be extremely vulnerable to emotional distress result-
ing from such communications. An Illinois statute proscribes attempts
to collect a debt from a spouse, unless the spouse is also liable, or un-
less the debt has been outstanding for 30 days. Section 3(g) of the
proposed statute recognizes that a spouse may be contacted if he or
she is in fact liable. Unlike the Illinois statute, however, no exception
is provided in the case of debts outstanding for 30 days, since the rea-
sons for barring such communications appear equally as valid regard-
less of the period of delinquency. Furthermore, many collectors make
no attempt to effectuate repayment until a debt has been outstanding
for at least 30 days; such an exception thus might well frustrate the
basic purpose of the section.
In addition to restricting individual communications to third parties,
section 3 (g) bars general communications to the public through the
publication of "deadbeat" lists. Several states which by statute regulate
licensed collection agency activities prohibit the use of such lists.ss The
basic justification for the prohibition is that the consumer is not afforded
notice and an opportunity to contest the charges before they are made
public.89 Although the posting of "deadbeat" lists is not violative of
constitutional guarantees of due process absent a showing of state
86. See, e.g., Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Texas 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
87. IlL. Aix. STAT. ch. 121 /z, § 262H (Supp. 1973).
88. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2008(5) (Supp. 1973); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6947 (b) (West Supp. 1974).
89. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), in which the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a statute under which a chief of police, without notice to
the debtor or hearing, caused a notice to be posted in all retail liquor stores forbidding
sales or gifts of liquor to the appellee. The Court held that procedural due process
required that the individual involved be given notice of the intention to post and an
opportunity to present his position. Id. at 436-37.
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action, 0 notions of fundamental fairness dictate that such activity
should not be permitted. It can be argued, in fact, that these publica-
tions should be barred regardless of whether notice and an opportunity
to contest are afforded the debtor. The publication of "deadbeat" lists
is typical of creditor activity wlich has tended to produce the physical
and emotional injuries frequently suffered by debtors subject to abu-
sive collection practices. Moreover, such publications may have a
deleterious effect on the consumer's financial situation, thereby decreas-
ing the likelihood that he will be able to pay the outstanding obligation.
Two exceptions to the third-party communications prohibition are
recognized. Section 3 (g) (1) permits disclosures pursuant to credit re-
porting statutes91 Credit reporting systems have become central to the
nation's credit economy. Prohibiting the use of such procedures with-
out providing adequate alternatives could greatly alter the credit mar-
ket, resulting in rate increases and restrictions on the availability of
credit to the marginal consumer. There are grave shortcomings in the
existing credit reporting industry, but providing solutions for these prob-
lems is beyond the scope of this legislation. Nevertheless, the proposed
statute evidences a limited attempt to correct one abuse of credit re-
porting by requiring notification to the customer of all credit reporting
disclosures. Such notification affords the consumer an opportunity to
dispute any information or to furnish necessary clarification before
suffering injury to his credit rating which might unjustifiably impair
his ability to function effectively in the marketplace.
A second exception to the nondisclosure provision appears in section
3(g) (2), which authorizes communication with employers who have
established debt counseling services. 92 Debt counseling can often fur-
nish an efficient and effective means of nonadjudicatory dispute settle-
ment between creditors and defaulting consumers. 3 Communications
to employers who do not provide debt counseling, however, are pro-
hibited because of the detrimental effect such contacts could have on
the employment relationship. Many employers, including the federal
government, have a policy of dismissing employees involved in col-
90. Arguably, statutory licensing and regulation of those engaging in collection
activities could constitute the requisite state action. See Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old
Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
91. See Appendix infra, § 3(g) (1) & accompanying Comment.
92. See id. § 3 (g) (2) & accompanying Comment.
93. It should be noted that in Virginia no fee may be charged for such services
furnished in connection with a debt pooling plan unless performed by a licensed
attorney. VA. CODE ANx. § 54-44.1 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
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lection disputes without any prior inquiry into the nature of the debt.9 4
From the employer's perspective this is not a completely arbitrary
action. He may well be concerned about possible garnishment pro-
ceedings and the transaction costs such proceedings would entail. Dis-
missal of the debtor may provide the easiest manner of avoiding these
difficulties. Even if the employee is not initially dismissed, the em-
ployer may induce payment through explicit or implicit threats of
dismissal. This situation produces once more the likelihood that the
debtor will be coerced into paying an invalid claim."6
This provision is of particular importance because in Virginia there
currently is no protection afforded the consumer from employer con-
tacts. The "insulting words statute" 96 does not bar statements by the
collector to the debtor's employer, provided such statements do not
impute dishonesty or relate to the debtor's performance as an employee. °r
94. Heaungson, Debt Collection Practices Before the National Conrmission on Con-
sumer Finance, 88 BANIG L.J. 291 (1971).
The ability of the employer to discharge the debtor after garnishment proceedings
have been instituted is restricted by Tide III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee on the ground that the
employee's wages were subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1674(a) (1970). For willful violations, the employer is subject to a fine of not more
than $1000 or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both. Id. § 1674(b). The
extent to which this provision would prohibit the employer from discharging the em-
ployee prior to the institution of garnishment proceedings is not clear. It has been held,
however, that the Act prohibits the utilization of warnings for first-time garnishments
for the purposes of a warning-discharge rule. Dept. of Labor, Wage-Hour Adminis-
trator's Opinion No. 1078 (WH-31) (Apr. 28, 1970). This ruling, based upon the
interpretation of the statute as prohibiting a discharge based wholly or partly on a first-
time garnishment, would seem to indicate that the prohibition extends to anticipated
garnishments as well.
Once the employee has been subject to a first-time garnishment, Title III would not,
of course, prohibit dismissal for subsequent garnishments, actual or anticipated. Such
action, however, may well be prohibited by a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 making it an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to discharge
any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1970). This provision has been utilized to invalidate
an employer policy of discharging an employee after several garnishments on the ground
that since a disproportionate percentage of the members of minority groups are subject
to garnishment, the effect of the policy was to discriminate against members of such
groups. Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971). In addi-
tion, the court in Johnson held that the employer's affirmative defense of "business
necessity" (recognized by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971)) applies only to job capability and performance and does not encompass
inconvenience, annoyance, or even expense to the employer. 332 F. Supp. at 495.
95. 2 D. Caplovitz, supra note 6, at 10-4.
96. VA. COD- AwN. § 8-630 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
97. Weaver v. Beneficial Fin. Co, 200 Va. 572, 106 S.E.2d 620 (1959).
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As indicated above, in a tort action the consumer must show intent by
the collector to bring about termination of the employment, and some
courts have imposed an additional requirement that the employment
relationship be one existing for a definite period rather than one termi-
nable at will. In view of the absence of protection for the employment
relationship and the improbability of the debt being repaid should
employment be terminated, it would appear that the detrimental effects
and unfairness that may result from allowing the employer to be brought
into a debtor/creditor dispute outweigh whatever advantage debt col-
lectors may gain from contacting employers. Thus, section 3 (g) (2)
authorizes disclosure of indebtedness to employers only when such
information might work to the benefit of all parties through the fur-
nishing of debt counseling.
Section 3 (h), prohibiting "any other conduct" which can reasonably
be expected to harass the debtor was included to allow the courts lati-
tude in handling collection cases.9 It is impossible to anticipate all
offensive practices that an overzealous debt collector might devise.
Through this provision the courts are authorized to redress grievances
resulting from acts which, although not specifically enumerated, are
nonetheless violative of the underlying purposes of the statute. A prob-
lem with this provision is that it appears to impair the previous attempts
to set meaningful standards of conduct and to delimit the perimeters
of prohibited practices. It is fair to say that section 3 (h) provides little
notice to collectors of those activities which might fall within its scope.
An alternative approach would be to omit the catchall provision and
require the legislature to amend the statute with specific provisions as
new abusive practices develop. Assuming that there are certain col-
lectors whose only concern is coercing payment with the least expense
and effort possible, it is likely that frequent statutory amendments
would be required to address novel techniques of collection. Such
amendments, unfortunately, would only be considered after a con-
sumer had suffered injury. It is foreseeable that the most oppressive
collectors would continually stay ahead of the legislature in devising
abusive approaches to debt collection. Therefore, it is believed to be
more satisfactory to include a provision such as section 3 (h) which
would provide relief from practices developed in attempts to circum-
vent proscriptions on other collection tactics. Sections 3 (a) through
3 (g) give notice to the collector of the types af activities deemed
98. See Appendix infra, § 3 (h) & accompanying Comment.
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harassing. These standards should furnish adequate guidelines for the
well-meaning collector whose activities will not approach the peri-
meters of unacceptable practice.
C. Remedies
Effective control of abusive collection practices depends ultimately
upon the question of enforcement. The primary enforcement method
utilized by the proposed statute is the private civil action by the indi-
vidual debtor aggrieved by creditor action. The necessity of effective
enforcement, however, requires a recognition of supplemental reme-
dies as well. Therefore, the statute permits debtors to raise statutory
violations as a complete defense to the underlying obligation"0 and to
petition for license revocation.100 In addition, it leaves undisturbed ex-
isting criminal sanctions for violations which are currently prohibited by
Virginia law.10 1
Section 4(b) specifies the basic enforcement mechanism of the statute
by permitting any consumer injured by a statutory violation to recover
actual damages or $200, whichever is greater. 02 Although, as noted,
existing criminal sanctions would remain for a number of the practices
prohibited by the model statute, civil remedies, for several reasons
would always be available to an aggrieved debtor. Initially, there exists
the problem of enforcement of criminal sanctions. By creating civil
penalties, the opportunity is given the individual consumer to initiate
the action. It is recognized that some grievances will never be redressed
if the initiative is left entirely to the consumer. Nevertheless, since a num-
ber of the prohibited practices do not justify criminal sanctions, the stat-
ute creates no additional criminal penalties. Civil remedies provide a flex-
ible remedy for what may be little more than overzealousness which,
99. See id. § 4(a) & accompanying Comment.
100. See id. § 4(d) & accompanying Comment.
101. See id. § 4(e) & accompanying Comment.
102. See id. § 4(b) & accompanying Comment. See generally Spanogle, Why Does
the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus.
LAw. 1039 (1968). Professor Kripke has criticized the suggestion that the private action
for minimum penalties, attorney's fees, or both would promote enforcement by increas-
ing consumer incentive. He contends that penalties generally are not sufficiently large
to provide a realistic incentive and that the probable result if they were would be
fabricated litigation with inflated damages claims. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in
Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. RPv. 1, 46-51 (1969). It can be argued that
Professor Kripke's suggested alternative, the expansion and development of legal services
offices for poor consumers (id. at 49), provides the least realistic possibility of effective
regulation of abusive creditor practices.
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while requiring sanction, may not deserve the opprobrium associated with
criminal prosecution. For those activities which have been recognized
as criminal, the public policy against such actions is underscored by
allowing private relief while retaining criminal sanction.
There are two additional reasons for providing civil as opposed to
further criminal remedies. The first is that some of the listed practices
are lacking in specificity. The loose definitions allow for flexibility in
dealing with unanticipated abusive practices. Were such practices sub-
ject to criminal penalties, constitutional due process problems would
require resolution. A final rationale for providing a civil remedy as the
principal means of enforcement is to permit those who have been vic-
timized to be compensated for their harm. Consumers are furnished a
statutory right to recover actual damages. In addition, if a penalty is
assessed under the provision for a $200 minimum recovery, it is awarded
to the individual who has been wronged.
A good faith defense is allowed the collector for an unintentional
violation resulting from a bona fide error.103 Such an error could arise
in a situation where several employees of a collecting firm contacted a
consumer within a short period of time, each failing to note this con-
tact in the consumer's file. Since no intent to harass might exist under
such circumstances, a defense should be permitted. It is apparent, how-
ever, that such defenses could be fabricated. The statute, therefore,
requires that the collector sustain the burden of proving his defense by
clear and convincing evidence. An alternative method of avoiding dif-
ficulties from fabricated defenses would be to impose strict liability on
the collector for all violations. Because such an approach might have
a severe detrimental impact on the credit market, it has been rejected.
There are two principal reasons for imposing a $200 minimum re-
covery under section 4(b) for victims of prohibited practices. First,
it is necessary to provide a substantial deterrent to such practices. The
use of abusive tactics must be made more costly than the use of accept-
able means of collection. Second, effective enforcement of the statute
requires that there be adequate incentive for an injured consumer to
seek redress. If the provable damages resulting from an abusive col-
lection technique are small, the consumer will be reluctant to expend
the time and effort required to obtain a judgment. Guaranteeing the
party wronged a minimum recovery of $200 will encourage challenges
to those collectors utilizing abusive practices and vindicate the public
policy expressed in the proposed statute.
103. See Appendix iMfra, §§ 4(a), (b), (c) & Comment 4(a).
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A similar concern for increasing the incentives to undertake private
enforcement justifies the provision in section 4(c) for recovery by suc-
cessful plaintiffs of court costs and attorney's fees.'014 Few consumers
will seek redress if the bulk of their recovery represents the costs of
bringing the action. The purpose of the statute will be better effectu-
ated by allowing consumers to recover those costs necessary for them
to assist in its enforcement.
Notwithstanding these incentives, the likelihood is great that some
collectors will never be challenged in spite of the abusive nature of their
collection practices. Low-income consumers are often unaware of the
existence of statutory grounds for contesting collector activity or, if
aware of their rights, are reluctant to utilize the judicial system to
assert them. Unfortunately, there is little that can be done by statute
to educate debtors as to their rights or to reduce their fear of the ju-
dicial system. Recognizing that many injured consumers will never
initiate action against abusive collectors, the statute includes a pro-
vision whereby proof of proscribed practices may be used as a shield.
Section 4(a) provides that if a consumer is sued on an obligation, proof
of a violation of the chapter will constitute a total defense.Y05 A con-
sumer willing to appear in court, rather than have a default judgment
entered against him, may raise the violation as a complete defense to
liability on the debt. This provision is cumulative with section 4(c),
thus allowing a consumer to recover attorneys' fees in cases where he
defends successfully.
There are two shortcomings of section 4(a). One problem is that
many low-income debtors are subject to default judgments either be-
cause they do not understand what is required of them or because they
fail to notify the proper parties of their inability to appear in court at
the appointed time. Section 4(a) provides no relief for these debtors.
It is clear, however, that abolition or restriction of default judgments
is beyond the established purpose and scope of this statute, particularly
in view of the increased costs of such a provision. The second difficulty
arises from the requirement that the customer prove a violation of the
chapter as a means of establishing a defense. Many of these practices,
by their nature, are difficult to prove, and section 4(a) affords no pre-
sumptions. The alternative would be to place the burden of proof on
the collector, requiring him to prove the negative. This virtually im-
104. See id. § 4(c) & accompanying Comment.
105. See id. § 4(a) & accompanying Comment.
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possible burden, like others previously discussed, might result in an
impermissible increase in the cost of credit. Furthermore, in order to
avoid the possibility of fictitious allegations by consumers, it is neces-
sary to require that they sustain the burden of proof; otherwise, the
consumer would be free to raise a defensive shield in every case. Im-
posing the proof burden on the consumer will aid the courts in their
factual determinations. It should be noted that under section 4(e), all
other statutory and common law defenses to the claim remain available
to the debtor.
As a final cumulative remedy, section 4(d) allows an injured con-
sumer to petition the Collection Agency Board to hold license revo-
cation proceedings. 100 Since a number of the prohibited practices ap-
pearing in this chapter are also barred by the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Virginia Collection Agency Board, with a possible
penalty of loss of license, a provision for private petition increases the
effectiveness of the Board's authority. Threat of license revocation
serves as an ultimate deterrent to abusive collections. It can be assumed
that few collection agencies will be willing to risk the future of their
operations merely to collect additional outstanding debts. Isolating col-
lection agencies from all other collectors to be subject to this sanction
is justified upon the ground that only these organizations devote their
entire business to collection activities.
III. CONCLUSION
An attempt has been made in this model statute to establish a unified
body of standards of conduct for all debt collectors and to provide
private remedies to those consumers injured by violations of these
standards. The restrictions placed upon collection tactics make it in-
cumbent upon creditors to undertake more sophisticated determinations
of those consumers who are likely to default on their obligations. It
is anticipated, however, that the restrictions imposed are not so severe
as to result in substantial increases in the cost of credit which would
force marginal consumers from the market.
The basic purpose of the statute has been to afford consideration to
the needs of all interested parties. The creditor/collector has an in-
terest in prompt payment and low collection costs. The consumer/
debtor desires freedom from harassment, protection of his reputation
and relationships with family, friends, and employer, and an oppor-
106. See id. § 4(d) & accompanying Comment.
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tunity to assert valid defenses. Society is concerned about the cost of
credit, control of collection practices, and a right to redress for griev-
ances. The proposed statute attempts to reflect these competing in-
terests in a manner designed to provide the greatest benefit for the
least cost.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED VIRGINIA DEBT COLLECTION ABUSE ACT
: 1. SCOPE
This chapter applies to conduct and practices in connection with the
collection of claims arising from consumer credit transactions.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
The purpose of this chapter is to compile provisions relating to collection
practices found throughout the Virginia Code and the existing tort law
relevant to debt collection into a cohesive body of law in order that those
engaging in collection will have notice of the restrictions placed on their
practices.
The rules and regulations adopted by the Virginia Collection Agency
Board shall apply to debt collection by licensed collection agencies wherever
no specific provision is found in-this chapter. In the case of conflict, this
chapter governs.
:§ 2. DEFINITIONS
(a) "Claim" means any obligation or alleged obligation arising from a
consumer credit transaction.(b) "Consumer Credit Transaction" means a transaction between a mer-
chant and a customer in which real or personal property, services, or money
is acquired on credit, and in which transaction the customer's obligation is
payable in installments or for which credit a finance charge is or may be
imposed.
'(c) "Customer" means a person,-other than an organization, who seeks
or acquires real or personal property, services, money, or credit for per-
sonal, family, household, or agricultural purposes.
(d) "Debt Collection" means any action, conduct, or practice of solicit-
ing claims for collection or in the collection of claims owed or due or al-
leged to be owed or due a merchant by a customer.
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(e) "Debt Collector" means any person engaging directly or indirectly
in debt collection.
(f) "Merchant" means any person who regularly deals in goods of a
kind, realty, services, or money, or who otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction, or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary
who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
This section assumes that transactions between a merchant and a casual
or inexperienced buyer require special and clear rules which may not apply
to transactions between professionals. No attempt is made to regulate com-
mercial dealings between merchants.
(a) "Claim". New. The term refers to any money, goods, or services
for which a customer is or may be liable.
(b) "Consumer Credit Transaction". New. The term "credit" refers to
the fact that the customer is allowed time in which to make payment. An
obligation is "payable in installments" if payment is permitted by agree-
ment to be made in two or more installments. The term "finance charge"
includes all charges payable directly or indirectly by the customer as an
incident to the extension of credit, including interest, amounts payable
under a discount, service charges, and insurance costs.
(c) "Customer". New. The definition reflects concern for the unique
situation of the unprofessional, individual buyer.
(d) "Debt Collection". New. The term is defined broadly to include
all activities in seeking to recover a debt which might lead to harassment
of a customer. The term includes activities undertaken to secure payment
of a claim which may be proven invalid.
(e) "Debt Collector". New. Included in the term are merchants, credit
sellers, lending institutions, collection agencies, and those offering forms to
be used as a collection device. The term does not include a printing com-
pany responsible only for the printing of the forms.
(f) "Merchant". The definition is derived from VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-104
(Added Vol. 1950), but is expanded to include those dealing in realty,
services, and money. The term includes, but is not limited to, a seller,
lessor, manufacturer, creditor, arranger of credit, and lending institution.
The professional status under the definition attaches only when a mer-
chant is dealing in his mercantile capacity. The clause "or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
broker .. ." means that even persons whose primary purpose is other than
1974]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the aforementioned activities may be included within the term "merchant"
if they employ personnel acting in such a capacity.
S 3. PROHIBITED PRACTICEs
In attempting to collect an alleged claim arising from a consumer credit
transaction, a debt collector shall not:
(a) Threaten the institution of legal proceedings;
(b) Utilize a communication which simulates legal or judicial process;
(c) Misrepresent or create false impressions concerning the true nature
of his business;
(d) Threaten violence or harm to the customer, those related to him, or
his property;
(e) Use obscene, defamatory, or threatening language in communicating
with a customer or person related to him;
(f) Communicate with the customer or a person related to him with such
frequency or at such unusual hours or in such a manner as can reasonably
be expected to harass;
(g) Disclose or threaten to disclose to a person other than the customer,
or his spouse if also liable, information concerning the existence of the
claim, except through proper legal proceedings. But this paragraph does
not prohibit:
(1) disclosure to another person of information permitted to be dis-
closed to him by statute, provided the customer is notified of such com-
munication;
(2) disclosure to the customer's employer when the employer has an
established debt counseling service;
(h) Engage in any other conduct which can reasonably be expected to
harass the customer or persons related to him.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
(a) The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of the Virginia State
Bar has stated that threatening institution of legal proceedings constitutes
the practice of law. Opinion No. 38, April 9, 1968. Those practicing law
without authority are subject to misdemeanor prosecution. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54-44 (Repl. Vol. 1972). Including this provision in the chapter gives
notice to all debt collectors that such a practice is prohibited. This pro-
vision appears in the Model Act to License and Regulate Collection Agen-
cies, drafted by the ABA National Conference of Lawyers and Collection
Agencies.
(b) The simulation of judicial process for the purpose of collecting
money is currently proscribed by VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-313 (Repl. Vol.
1960). The provision is included in this chapter for the purpose of present-
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ing a unified body of law controlling debt collection. Examples of pro-
scribed writings include those intended to represent warrants, process,
notice of motion for judgment, and notice of execution lien.
(c) The debt collector shall not engage in such conduct as might de-
ceive the consumer of the collector's true status. Activities barred under
section 3(c), as tending to create false impressions, include use of names
other than the true business name, use of insignias or initials suggesting
government involvement, and impersonation of an officer of the peace, as
is currently proscribed by VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-311 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
(d) The purpose of this subsection is to prevent extortionate credit prac-
tices, currently barred by VA. CODE ANN'. § 18.1-184 (Rep1. Vol. 1960), by
providing private redress for the victims. Protection is extended to those
related to the customer and his property, as such threats might invoke
greater fear than threats of harm to the customer himself. It is not neces-
sary that the customer have anticipated that such practice would occur at
the time the transaction was entered. All attempts to collect claims through
threats of violence and harm are prohibited. This provision reflects the
reasoning behind the torts of assault and battery and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
(e) This provision makes the "insulting words statute," VA. CoDE ANN.
S 8-630 (Repl. Vol. 1957), specifically applicable in the debt collection
situation and facilitates private recovery. Private actions for use of such
language have also been authorized in tort actions for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and libel. Both written and oral communications are
included within the scope of this section. In addition to the "insulting
words statute," which has been held to apply to written as well as oral
communication, Chaffin v. Lynch, 83 Va. 106, 1 S.E. 803 (1887), several
other sources provide the basis for this section. Under VA. CODE ANN.
S 18.1-238 (RepI. Vol. 1960), it is a misdemeanor to use obscene language
over the telephone. In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 1718 (1970) prohibits the
mailing of material displaying on the outside cover obscene, defamatory,
or threatening matter; Regulation XI, 3 of the Virginia Collection Agency
Board forbids licensees from violating the U.S. Postal Laws.
(f) This provision derives its basis from the invasion of privacy tort. See
Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956). Communication
may be in the form of letters, visits, or phone calls. Although disclosure
to others of information regarding the claim is barred under section 3(g),
it is necessary to include communication to persons related to the debtor
in this section in order to prevent harassing communication which may not
mention the alleged debt. See Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174,
132 So. 2d 321 (1961). "[I]n such a manner as can reasonably be expected
to harass" includes such practices as calling relatives long distance, collect,
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Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64, (1954); coercive
communications, Holloway v. Davis, 44 Ala. App. 346, 208 So. 2d 794
(1967); and contacting the customer at his place of employment, Bieder-
man's of Springfield, Incs. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).
(g) This provision also is based in the invasion of privacy tort. It pre-
vents communications to friends and relatives which might harass or dis-
tress them and cause embarrassment to the customer resulting in a decision
to forego legal defenses to the claim. Also barred are communications to
the public through such practices as the publication of "deadbeat" lists and
the placing of signs in store windows advertising nonpayment by named
customers. See Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
Subsection (1) excepts communications authorized by statutes such as
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970). However, a re-
quirement of notification of such communications to the customer is im-
posed in order that he might contest invalid claims and clarify misleading
information.
Subsection (2) excepts communications to employers with established
debt counseling services. It is recognized that such services may be ex-
tremely beneficial to all parties concerned, and use of such services is to
be encouraged. In all other situations, however, no communications can
be made to the employer due to the potential for disruption of the em-
ployment relationship.
(h) The purpose of including this provision is to allow the courts lati-
tude in dealing with collection practices. It is recognized that abusive prac-
tices not covered by the preceding list might be utilized, and this section
could provide a remedy in such situations. The preceding sections provide
collectors with notice as to the type of conduct which may constitute
harassment.
§ 4. REMEDIES
(a) Release from Obligation. Proof that a debt collector has violated any
provision of this chapter shall constitute a complete defense to any legal
action to enforce the claim that was being collected at the time such vio-
lation occurred, and the customer shall be released from all obligation on
said claim: Provided, however, that if the debt collector shows by clear
and convincing evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted
from a bona fide error, the customer shall not be released from the claim.
(b) Damages. A customer injured by violation of this chapter may re-
cover actual damages or $200, whichever is greater. A debt collector may
not be held liable for damages in any action brought under this section if
the debt collector shows by clear and convincing evidence that the vio-
lation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error.
[Vol. 15:567
ABUSIVE DEBT COLLECTION
(c) Costs and Fees. If a customer establishes that a debt collector has
violated any provision of this chapter and the collector does not show by
clear and convincing evidence that the violation was not intentional and
resulting from a bona fide error, the customer shall be awarded court' costs
and attorney's fees based on work reasonably performed.
(d) License Revocation. A customer injured by violation of this chap-
ter by a licensed collection agency may petition the Collection Agency
Board to hold a hearing to determine if the license of such agency should
be revoked: Provided, however, that no hearing shall be held if the cus-
tomer has sought and failed to prevail under section 4(a), section 4(b), or
both.
(e) Other Remedies Not Affected. The grant of remedies in this chap-
ter does not affect remedies available to a customer under principles of law
or equity; nor does it affect criminal charges which may be brought for
conducting proscribed practices.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
This section sets forth certain remedies of the customer in the event of
violation of this chapter by the debt collector. All remedies provided in
the subsections are cumulative.
(a) The burden of proof rests with the customer to establish that a vio-
lation has in fact occurred. If such burden is successfully sustained, the
burden passes to the collector to show that such violation was not inten-
tional and resulted from a bona fide error. Should the collector fail to
establish such a defense by "clear and convincing" evidence, the customer
is released from liability. The use of the word "shall" indicates that the
action is both authorized and required.
(b) A minimum monetary penalty is specified to cover cases where a.vio-
lation is established but proof of damages is difficult. A good faith defense
is allowed the debt collector for actions for damages; however, no pre-
sumptions are created, and the standard of proof resting on the collector
is "clear and convincing evidence."
(c) A customer who prevails under section 4(a), section 4(b), or both,
is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. This award is not discretionary
except as to amount. In determining the amount of the award, considera-
tion shall be given to the work reasonably performed by the attorney, not
to the amount of the recovery. Provision is also made for a prevailing
customer to recover court costs.
(d) In order to promote the purpose of the Rules and Regulations of
the Collection Agency Board, the customer is authorized to seek a license
revocation hearing. This provision is cumulative with other customer
remedies. However, a limit is placed on the cumulative nature of the
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remedy if the customer has been unsuccessful in asserting the violation
under section 4(a), section 4(b), or both, in order to avoid burdening the
Collection Agency Board with hearings based on frivolous charges.
(e) Such actions as suits for declaratory judgments, injunctive relief, and
tort claims remain unaffected. Misdemeanor prosecution for practices pro-
scribed by this chapter is cumulative with the remedies afforded the cus-
tomer.
§ 5. EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS
This chapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt the debt collector
from complying with, any other laws of the State of Virginia, except to
the extent that those laws are inconsistent with the provisions of this chap-
ter, and then only to the extent of such inconsistency shall this chapter
prevail.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
All legislation inconsistent with this chapter is superseded.
§ 6. SEvEiABILITY
If a provision enacted by this chapter is held invalid, all valid provisions
that are severable from the invalid provision remain in effect. If a provision
enacted by this chapter is held invalid in one or more of its applications, the
provision remains in effect in all valid applications that are severable from
the invalid application or applications.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
All provisions and clauses within this chapter are to be given effect in-
sofar as they are legally valid.
